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Summary
A crucial stage in hominin evolution was the develop-
ment of metatool use—the ability to use one tool on
another [1, 2]. Although the great apes can solve meta-
tool tasks [3, 4], monkeys have been less successful
[5–7]. Here we provide experimental evidence that
New Caledonian crows can spontaneously solve
a demanding metatool task in which a short tool is
used to extract a longer tool that can then be used to
obtain meat. Six out of the seven crows initially
attempted to extract the long tool with the short tool.
Four successfully obtained meat on the first trial.
The experiments revealed that the crows did not solve
the metatool task by trial-and-error learning during the
task or through a previously learned rule. The sophis-
ticated physical cognition shown appears to have
been based on analogical reasoning. The ability to
reason analogically may explain the exceptional tool-
manufacturing skills of New Caledonian crows.
Results and Discussion
Metatool use was one of the major innovations in human
evolution [1, 2]. The use of simple stone tools to make
more complex tools may reflect the ‘‘cognitive leap’’
that initiated technological evolution in hominins [2].
Metatool use has three distinct cognitive challenges.
First, an individual must recognize that tools can be
used on nonfood objects. This recognition may require
analogical reasoning abilities [2]. Second, an individual
must initially inhibit a direct response toward the main
goal of obtaining food, a reaction that both children
and primates find difficult to suppress [8–10]. Third, an
individual must be capable of hierarchically organized
behavior [11, 12]. That is, they must be able to flexibly
integrate newly innovated behavior (tool/tool) with es-
tablished behaviors as a subgoal in achieving a main
goal (tool/tool/food). Such flexible, hierarchical or-
ganization of behavior has been suggested to follow
a recursive pattern and to require cognitive processing
similar to language production [13].
In early hominins, the transfer of a thrusting percus-
sion technique from breaking nuts to knapping cutting
tools was likely part of longer behavioral sequences in
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[2]. Metatool use, therefore, probably involved consider-
able behavioral organization in space and time. Tests for
metatool use in great apes and monkeys have typically
followed an experimental design where a small stick
can be used to retrieve a nearby longer stick that can
then be used to gain otherwise inaccessible food. The
close proximity of the tools and the food in these tests
eliminates tool transport and facilitates assessment of
the relevant requirements of the task. It also makes it rel-
atively easy to accidentally touch the long tool with the
short tool in normal exploratory behavior, and thereby
chance upon the solution. Increased distance between
tools and the food source has been suggested to
increase the cognitive demands of a tool task [3, 14].
Striking evidence is now emerging that Corvidae have
convergently evolved cognitive abilities that rival those
of our primate relatives [15]. Evidence for convergent
evolution include the impressive tool-manufacturing
skills of New Caledonian crows (Corvus moneduloides)
[16–21] and complex physical cognition in non-tool-
using rooks (Corvus frugilegus) [22]. To test whether
New Caledonian crows (crows hereafter) are capable
of metatool use, we used an experimental design similar
to the standard design used with great apes [3, 4]. We
modified the design to give a greater degree of spatial
and temporal separation between the tools and the
food. In our experiments, food (meat) was placed in
a 15 cm deep horizontal hole 1.75 m away from two iden-
tical ‘‘toolboxes’’ (Figure 1). The front of each toolbox
consisted of vertical bars that allowed a crow to insert
its bill but not its head. We placed an 18 cm long stick
tool 4 cm inside one toolbox. This tool was long enough
to extract the meat but out of reach of a crow’s bill. In the
other toolbox, we placed a stone in a similar position.
The positions of the stone and tool were randomized be-
tween the toolboxes across trials. Presenting both a rel-
evant and an irrelevant object controlled for random
probing of the toolboxes leading to a solution by trial
and error. In front of the toolboxes, we placed a 5 cm
long tool (Figure 1). This tool was too short to extract
the meat but could be used to extract the long tool
from the tool box. Successful completion of the task re-
quired a crow to use the short stick to extract the long
stick from the box and then transport the long stick to
the hole and extract the food.
All seven crows developed metatool use and ex-
tracted the food (Figure 2). Icarus, Luigi, and Gypsy
spontaneously produced the correct behavioral se-
quence in the first trial (Gypsy’s and Icarus’s first trial
are shown in Movies S1 and S2, respectively, in the
Supplemental Data available online). This was despite
the requirement to transport tools and the difficulty in
obtaining a tool from behind the bars. Joker also suc-
cessfully solved the problem on the first trial, but made
the error of taking the short tool to the hole after a first
attempt at extracting the long stick (Figure 2). Colin,
Lucy, and Ruby first extracted food in the 5th, 19th, and
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short stick by six of the seven crows was either success-
ful metatool use or a failed attempt to extract the long
tool. This performance is comparable with that of the
great apes [3, 4]. In the first trial, five out of six gorillas
and three out of five orangutans used a tool as a metatool
[3]. However, only three out of five chimpanzees (Pan
troglodytes) developed metatool use, and these individ-
uals first made the error of attempting to use the small,
nonfunctional stick tool to obtain the food [4]. Monkeys
have been less successful. One out of two capuchins
(Cebus apella) performed at a similar level to gorillas
and developed metatool use on the first trial [5]. In an-
other study, only one out of six capuchins used tools
as metatools and this individual succeeded in less than
50% of trials [7]. Despite receiving considerable training
on tool use, Japanese macaques (Macaca fuscata) did
not attempt metatool use on the first trial and required
more than 50 trials to achieve a 75% success rate [6].
Initial use of the nonfunctional tool in an attempt to get
the food frequently occurs in primate metatool-use
studies [3, 4]. In our experiment, only Lucy made the
error of first taking the nonfunctional stick to the hole.
Four crows (Ruby, Joker, Luigi, and Colin) occasionally
attempted to use the nonfunctional tool to get food in
later trials, but only after unsuccessfully trying to extract
the long tool with the short tool. These crows appeared
to have had difficulty extracting the long tool from the
barred toolbox. They may have then taken the non-
functional short tool to the hole because of problems
inhibiting tool use when no other course of action was
available.
The task could have been solved by trial-and-error
learning if crows had initially used tool-related explor-
atory behavior toward the toolboxes and stumbled
across the solution. However, the crows did not ran-
domly probe the toolboxes. The first toolbox probed
by all seven crows was the one with the long stick rather
than the stone. In fact, only Ruby ever probed the tool-
box containing the stone; she did so once, several trials
after successful metatool use. This suggests that meta-
tool use did not develop through trial-and-error learning
during the experiment. The use of a previously learned
behavioral rule by the crows is also unlikely. Familiariza-
tion training with the apparatus did not involve metatool
use, and we have never seen this behavior in the wild in
Figure 1. The Metatool-Use Task
The experimental apparatus consists of a long, functional tool in one toolbox, a stone in the second toolbox, a short, nonfunctional tool in front of
both toolboxes, and a 15 cm deep horizontal hole in which meat was placed. The distance between the hole and the toolboxes was 1.75 m but is
reduced in the image to save space.
Figure 2. Trial-by-Trial Description of Experiment One
The long, functional tool was in a toolbox and the short, nonfunctional tool was in front of the toolboxes.
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The positions of the long and short tools were
reversed; the short, nonfunctional tool was in
a toolbox and the long, functional tool was in
front of the toolboxes. Icarus did not partici-
pate in these trials.more than 3 years of observing crows on Mare´. The
spontaneous development of metatool use therefore re-
quired cognition more complex than simple learning
mechanisms.
One possibility is that the crows solved the metatool
task by analogical reasoning. Successfully constructing
an analogy requires that an individual maps experience
from previous problems onto a structurally similar, novel
problem [23–25]. One language-trained chimpanzee has
been reported to have solved both figural and concep-
tual analogy problems [26]. The crows may have solved
the metatool-use task by perceiving the shared causal
relationship between the task and normal tool use,
namely that a tool can access out of reach objects. Chil-
dren’s performance with causal analogies depends in
part on knowledge of the relevant causal properties of
the task [27–29]. Causal understanding is indicated by
the spontaneous correction of mistakes in an appropri-
ate, goal-directed way [30, 31]. If the crows had under-
stood the relevant causal relationship in this experiment,
we would expect them to use this knowledge to avoid
making errors based on tool type.
To see whether crows were sensitive to the causal
aspects of the food extraction task, we carried out a sec-
ond experiment where the positions of the short and
long tools were reversed. The long tool was now freely
available so that metatool use was not required to ex-
tract the food. In the first block of five trials, all six crows
tested initially inserted the long tool into the toolbox
containing the short tool, but this generally occurred in
the first block of five trials (Figure 3). This behavior usu-
ally lasted momentarily and there was often no contact
with the short tool. In the only exception, Lucy extracted
the short stick from the toolbox in her first trial but did
not take it to the hole. No crow took the short stick to
the hole. The insertion of the long tool appeared to be
due to the difficulties in deviating from habitual behavior
[32]. The crows may have routinely probed the toolbox
with the long tool because they had been rewarded in
the previous ten metatool-use trials for probing the
box. The crows rapidly rectified this mistake, suggest-
ing that they were sensitive to the causal relationship
between the tools and the final goal.
Our findings provide experimental evidence that New
Caledonian crows can spontaneously solve a metatool
task. On their first attempt to solve the problem, sixout of seven crows used the short tool to probe the tool-
box with the long tool. This appropriate spontaneous
behavior and the quick correction of causal errors sug-
gest that the crows used analogical reasoning to solve
the metatool task. Analogical reasoning may be the cru-
cial factor in the exceptional tool-manufacturing skills of
New Caledonian crows.
Experimental Procedures
We carried out the experiments with seven wild New Caledonian
crows captured on Mare´ Island, New Caledonia. We housed up to
three crows at a time in a 2-cage outdoor aviary at the location of
capture; each cage was 4 m 3 2 m 3 3 m high. After capture,
a crow was left to get accustomed to the aviary and human presence
for 3 days before the experimental procedures began. During the
experimental work, crows were held in one cage and the experimen-
tal apparatus was in the second cage; crows could not see between
the cages. All crows were released at their site of capture after the
experiment.
Each crow was given 10 familiarization trials in each of the follow-
ing tasks before testing began: (1) extracting meat from the 15 cm
deep horizontal hole with an 18 cm long stick that we provided; (2)
withdrawing an 18 cm long stick from the toolbox and extracting
meat from the hole (one end of the stick extended out between the
bars, making it easy for crows to see and extract it); and (3) using
a nonfunctional 5 cm long stick to try and extract meat from the 15
cm deep hole. The familiarization trials were carried out in blocks
of five, in the following sequence: (1), (2), (3), (1), (2), and (3).
Before the first trial in the testing phase, each crow was given a 5
min familiarization period with the experimental setup without the
short tool present. The short tool was placed in front of the tool-
boxes at the start of all trials. The trials were 10 min long and in
blocks of five. To ensure that birds were exposed to the problem
for standardized blocks of time, the position of the short stick was
reset if a bird moved and then discarded it before the 10 min trial pe-
riod ended. Testing continued until a crow had solved the task in
80% of trials across two consecutive 5-trial blocks or until 35 trials
had been completed.
Supplemental Data
Two movies are available at http://www.current-biology.com/cgi/
content/full/17/17/1504/DC1/.
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